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BRUSSELS – The currencies of many emerging markets are crashing, and their 
central banks are busy tightening policy, trying to stabilize their countries’ financial 
markets. Who is to blame for this state of affairs? 
A few years ago, when the US Federal Reserve embarked on yet another round of 
“quantitative easing,” some emerging-market leaders complained loudly. They saw 
the Fed’s open-ended purchases of long-term securities as an attempt to engineer a 
competitive devaluation of the dollar and feared that ultra-easy monetary conditions 
in the United States would unleash a flood of “hot money” inflows into their 
markets, driving up their exchange rates. This, they worried, would not only 
diminish their export competitiveness and push their external accounts into deficit; it 
w o u l d  a l s o  e x p o s e  t h e m  t o  t h e  h a r s h  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  a  s u d d e n  s t o p  i n  c a p i t a l  
inflows when US policymakers reversed course. 
At first sight, these fears appear to have been well founded. As the title of a recent 
paper published by the International Monetary Fund succinctly puts it, “Capital 
Flows are Fickle: Anytime, Anywhere.” The mere announcement that the Fed might 
scale down its unconventional monetary-policy operations has led to today’s capital 
flight from emerging markets. 
But this view misses the real reason why capital flowed into emerging markets over 
the last few years, and why the external accounts of so many of them have swung 
into deficit. The real culprit is the euro. 
Quantitative easing in the US cannot have been behind these large swings in global 
current-account balances, because America’s external deficit has not changed 
significantly in recent years. This is also what one would expect from economic 
theory: in conditions approaching a liquidity trap, the impact of unconventional 
monetary policies on financial conditions and demand is likely to be modest. 
Indeed, the available models tell us that, to the extent that an expansionary monetary 
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should not be large, because any positive effect on exports from a weaker exchange 
rate should be offset by larger imports due to the increase in domestic demand. 
This is what has happened in the US, and its recent economic revival has been 
accompanied by an expansion of both exports and imports. The impact of the various 
rounds of quantitative easing on emerging markets (and on the rest of the world) has 
thus been approximately neutral. 
But austerity in Europe has had a profound impact on the eurozone’s current 
account, which has swung from a deficit of almost $100 billion in 2008 to a surplus of 
almost $300 billion this year. This was a consequence of the sudden stop of capital 
flows to the eurozone’s southern members, which forced these countries to turn their 
current accounts from a combined deficit of $300 billion five years ago to a small 
surplus today. Because the external-surplus countries of the eurozone’s north, 
Germany and Netherlands, did not expand their demand, the eurozone overall is 
now running the world’s largest current-account surplus – exceeding even that of 
China, which has long been accused of engaging in competitive currency 
manipulation. 
This extraordinary swing of almost $400 billion in the eurozone’s current-account 
balance did not result from a “competitive devaluation”; the euro has remained 
strong. So the real reason for the eurozone’s large external surplus today is that 
internal demand has been so weak that imports have been practically stagnant over 
the last five years (the average annual growth rate was a paltry 0.25 %). 
The cause of this state of affairs, in one word, is austerity. Weak demand in Europe is 
the real reason why emerging markets’ current accounts deteriorated (and, with the 
exception of China, swung into deficit). 
Thus, if anything, emerging-market leaders should have complained about European 
austerity, not about US quantitative easing. Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s talk of 
“tapering” quantitative easing might have triggered the current bout of instability; 
but emerging markets’ underlying vulnerability was made in Europe. 
The fickleness of capital markets poses once again the paradox of thrift. As capital 
withdraws from emerging markets, these countries soon will be forced to adopt their 
own austerity measures and run current-account surpluses, much like the eurozone 
periphery today. But who will then be able – and willing – to run deficits? 
Two of the world’s three largest economies come to mind: China, given the strength 
of its balance sheet, and the eurozone, given the euro’s status as a reserve currency. 
But both appear committed to running large surpluses (indeed, the two largest in the 
world). This implies that, unless the US resumes its role as consumer of last resort, 
the latest bout of financial-market jitters will weaken the global economy again. And 
any global recovery promises to be unbalanced – that is, if it materializes at all. 
 
 